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Abstract
This article exemplifies the application of mathematical (game theoretic)
modeling to describe economic phenomenon, i.e., conflicts within the global
trading system. The main proposition of this article is that broadening time
horizon and promoting information exchange between the parties in conflicts
will result in cooperative solution.
1 Tntroduction
The world has made remarkable progress during the past five decades in lowering the
barriers on goods and investment that were erected before World War II. Increased
integration has contributed to an unprecedented period of growth and prosperity.
But as border barriers have been lowered, differences in national domestic policies
have been exposed to international scrutiny. These domestic policies are creating
new tension and conflicts (Lawrence et al, 1995).
By employing the so-called Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Azis (1995) de-
veloped a stylized model of the conflicts and analyzed it in a game theoretic frame-
work", He predicted, among others, that the solution of the conflicts would likely
be non-cooperative unless the parties in conflicts made some special efforts.
This paper views the potential conflicts more optimistically. We will show that
if dynamic aspects are incorporated in the game theoretic framework, a more opti-
mistic solution can be predicted. Furthermore, we will show that a better quality
of information structure will ensure the existence of a 'more stable cooperative equi-
librium .
•An earlier version of this paper was presented in a seminar on "Game Theory in International
Economics" at Cornell University, November 15, 1995. The aut.hor thanks Professors Iwan J. Azis,
Sid Saltzman, and Walter Isard for useful discussion and encouragement. Financial support from
the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia is gratefully acknowledged.
tLecturer (Bogor Agricutural University) and Visiting Scholar (Cornell University)
IA long list of reference on Analytic Hierarchy Process, including those written in seven la-
nguages, can be found, among others, in Saaty (1994).
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In the next section we will give a qwck review on how to model the conflicts
using AHP in a game theoretic framework. The dynamic models of the game with
imperfect and perfect information structures will be discussed in Section 3 and 4
respectively. We conclude this paper by providing some discussion on the policy
implications and suggestions for further study in Section 5.
2 Modeling the Conflicts by using AHP
FollowingAzis (1995), we set a premise that there are two parties (players) in the
game, i.e. the developed countries party (DC) and the less developed countries party
(LCD)2. In the global economic and trading system LCD has four targets, i.e.
(1) Increase market access to developed countries,
(2) Maintain high economic growth,
(3) Improve industrial efficiencyby reducing import cost, and
(4) Sustain economic and political stability nationally and regionally.
To meet targets LCD has two strategies, i.e.
(1) Continue the trade liberalization, and
(2) Improve the domestic structure (human right, environment, iabor practice,
etc.)
On the other hand, DC has three levels of decision making process, i.e. setting
objectives, targets, and strategies. Her objectives are
(1) Achieve strong economic growth,
(2) Impose her value system (e.g. human right and democracy) worldwide, and
(3) Insure an environmental resources.
Strategies available to DC are
(1) Implementation a quiet diplomacy to improve social and political conditions
in LCD,
,(2) Support GAIT/WTO rules to open markets in LCD, and
(3) Implement protection measures (tougher stance) but still within the GATT
rules.
Considering the two sets of strategies available to the players, we can conduct a
series of steps in AHP which will result in the followingpayoff bimatrix.
2Toavoid confusionwe refer LCD as a male and DC as a female.
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Matrix 1.
Payoffs to the players with respective joint strategies
(The first and the second entries in the cell are payoffs to LDC and DC
respectively)
DC's Strategies
LDC's Strategies Quiet Support Benign
Diplomacy GATT Protection
Change in Structure
and Trade (.298;.258) (.176;.211) (.074;.250)
Liberalization
Trade Liberalization
Being Continued (.143;.071) (.205;.043) (.104;.067)
We can observe in Matrix 1 that no Nash Equilibrium (Nash, 1950) exists in this
static game with pure strategies". A tentative conclusion which can be drawn from
this fact is that no stable solution exists in this game. In the followingsections wewill
alter the conclusion by incorporating dynamics and perfect information structure
into the model.
3 A Dynamic Model with Complete but Imperfect
Information
It can be figured out that the game discussed in the previous section has the following
characteristics: (1) static, i.e. the game is played only once (single stage game, no
dynamic aspect involved), (2) complete, i.e. the payoff of each joint strategy is
common knowledge, and (3) imperfect, i.e. strategies are played simultaneously.
In this section we will analyze the same game but with incorporating dynamic
aspect. The information structure remains the same, i.e. complete and imperfect. In
the next section wewillmodify the game by assuming perfect information structure.
To start the analysis notice that the DC's second strategy is strictly dominated
by the third strategy (see Matrix 1). Therefore, from now on we will exclude DC's
second strategy from our analysis.
To incorporate dynamic aspect into the model, we will consider a multistage
game, i.e. we will repeat the game N times, where N is a sufficiently large integer.
It is reasonable to assume that no player exactly knows when the game will end.
Consequently, for the sake of tractability but without loss of generality we analyze
an infinitely repeated game. We are inspired by the Folk Theorem (Friedman, 1971),
but we face a rather different situation. We have a kind of Prisoners' dilemmawith
an asymmetric payoffmatrix but with no single Nash Equilibrium exists.
In a static game a strategy is simply a single action. In a dynamic game, however,
a player's strategy specifies the action the player will take in each stage, for each
possible history of play through the previous stage. Accordingly, we will use the
3For a discussion on Nash Equilibrium and other elementary concepts in Game Theory men-
tioned in this paper, see any standard textbook in Game Theory, e.g. Gibbons (1992).
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term action to refer a row or a column of the payoffmatrix. We will call the LDC's
strategy in Matrix 1 Player I's action-l and action-2. Analogously, we will DC's
strategies Player II's action-l and action-S.
Definition 1 (Cooperative Joint Actions) If Player I plays action-l and Player
II plays action-2, and accordingly result in payoff pair (.298;.258), then this joint
actions (action-l,action-l) is called the cooperative joint actions.
We call this joint actions cooperative because if the players were in cooperative
game they would certainly choose (action-l,action-l). This pair of actions gives
the maximum total (combined) payoff. Notice that in a cooperative game payoffs
are assumed transferable among the players, i.e, players maximize the combined
payoffs and they may redistribute it in a way that satisfies them (e.g. with side
payments). We will show that even in a cooperative game, under a mild assumption,
the cooperative joint actions will be considered by the players as their best choice.
Definition 2 (Present Value) Given the discount factor S = 1:r' where T is the
interest rate per stage, the present value of 7tj ,7tl, 7t3, ... is
00
PV = 7tj + S7t2 + S27t3 + ...= r.St-l7tt.
t=l
Let us now formalize our repeated game:
(1) At stage-l players simultaneously choose actions from their feasible sets of
actions respectively. Each player receives 7tl according to Matrix 1.
(2) At stage-t, t = 2,3,4, ..., players observe the outcome of all previous stages
and then simultaneously choose actions from their feasible sets of actions re-
spectively. Each player receives 7tt according to Matrix 1.
(3) Each player maximizes his present value of the infinite sequence of payoffs.
For Player 1 the best joint actions is the cooperative joint actions. It will give
him the maximum payoff. He knows, however, that the cooperative joint actions
is only second best for Player II. The best joint actions for Player II is (action-l,
action-S} which will give her a payoff .350. Player II's action-S, however, is very
risky, because if it is combined with Player I's action-2 then Player II receives the
worst payoffs (.067).
Player I is in position to offerpromise to play his action-l in the hope that Player
II at the same time plays her action-1. This combination of actions will result in the
cooperative joint actions. Yet Player I realizes that his promise will tempt Player
II to play her action-S in which Player I must threaten to punish Player II if the
latter deviates from the cooperative joint actions. Player I will punish Player II by
playing action-2 forever, in which case Player II will receive payoff at most .071
per stage.
The Effects of Dynamics and Information Structures on the Solution of Conflicts in
the Global Economic and Trading System
8MA, VoL 1, No.1, Juli, 2002, 13-23 IT
Claim 1 (Player l's Commitment to Cooperate) If both players choose the
cooperative joint actions, then Player I does not have the incentive to deviate from
it.
Proof. The maximum payoff Player I can receive from playing non cooperative
action is less than the payoff he receives from the cooperative joint action, i.e.
.143 < .298 per stage. _
Definition 3 (The Trigger Strategy) The specification of the trigger strategy is
as follows. At stage-l play the cooperative action. At stage-t, where t = 2,3,4, ... , if
at stage t - 1 the cooperative joint actions occurs then play the cooperative action;
otherwise play the non-cooperative action forever.
Claim 2 (The Advantage of Playing Non-Cooperative Action at the First
Opportunity) If a player believes that playing non-cooperative action is more pro-
fitable than otherwise, then he (she) will play it at his (her) first opportunity.
Proof. This claim is only relevant to Player II. Let 71tbe the payoff of a player
receives at stage-to Let u be the maximum of Trt, i.e. u 2: 71t,for all t. Let PVt be
the present value whose tth term of 71is substituted by u, i.e.
PV ~ ~t - 2 c t - 1 - tt =711 +u7rz + ... +u 7rt-1 +u u+b 71t+1+ ....
Then PVi 2: PVj if and only if i ::; j since 6 ::; 1. -
Illustr-ation of CIa;j"Y' 2:
PV1
U + 61(2 + 821(3 + ...
> PV2 2: PV3 ~
> 711+ Su + 82713+ ...2: 711+ 8712+ S2u + ...
Claim 3 (The Credibility of Player 1's Promise and Threat) Player I's
promise is to cooperate [oreoer unless Player II at stage-t deviates from the cooper-
ative joint actions in which case Player I will execute his threat at stage t + 1 and
at all stages that follow. Player I's threat is to play non-cooperative action forever.
The promise is credible because it will give the maximum benefit to Player 1. The
threat is credible because - if it is executed - it will. hurt Player II much more severely
than it will hurt Player 1.
Proof. See Claim 1for the proof of credibility of Player I's promise. To prove
the credibility of the threat, compare the present values Player II will receive in the
cooperative and the non-cooperative scenarios.
00
PV{cooperative) = L 8t-1 (.258)
t=1
00
.258L s'
t=O
.258
1 - 6·
The Effects of Dynamics and Information Structures on the Solution of Conflicts in
the Global Economic and Trading System
18 D_ S. Pr iyarsono
From Claim 2 we know that the maximum payoff to Player II in the non-cooperative
scenario is
PV( non-cooperative)
00
= .350 + .071 .L bt
t=l
279 .071. + 1 -b'
Obviously, PV(cooperative) > PV(non-cooperative) for any b > .3297 or equi-
valently for any r < 203.31 %. On the other hand, if Player II is non-cooperative,
the best response of Player I is to punish player II by playing action-2, because at
least he will receive a payoff of .104 per stage instead of only .074 in case where he
(irrationally) keeps on playing action-1. _
Claim 4 (The Existence of Cooperative Equilibrium) In the dynamic game
(infinitely repeated game) with complete but imperfect information with payoff struc-
ture shown in Matrix 1, there exists a cooperative equilibrium for any b sufficiently
close to one.
Proof. Since the promise and the threat of Player I are credible (see Claim 3),
the best strategy of Player II is to cooperate at each stage of the game. _
To conclude this section, notice that in our context the meaning of discount
factor simply measures the players' patience. If a player sets b-= 1, then for him
(her) it is indifference to receive a benefit today or to receive it next year (and those
this player is very patience). The interest rate measures the players' impatience,
since it is inversely related to the discount factor.
.4 A Dynamic Model with Complete and Perfect
Information
In this section we will show that if we can improve the quality of information struc-
ture (to become perfect instead of imperfect), then we can guarantee the existence
equilibrium without any condition on the discount rate. Furthermore, the coope-
rative equilibrium is in a sense more stable than the one discussed in the previous
section. Our model is similar to the Stackelberg (1934) duopolymodel. The di-
fference is that our strategy spaces are discrete, where as the strategy spaces in his
model are continuous.
We will analyze two dynamic games with perfect information, by which we mean
that at each move in the game the player with the move knows the full history of
the play of the game thus far. For the payoff structure we will again refer to Matrix
1. The sequence of the game is as follows.
(1) A player (the leader) chooses an action from his (her) feasible set of actions.
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(2) The other player (the follower) observes the leader's actions and then chooses
an action from his (her) own feasible set of actions.
(3) Each player maximizes his (her) payoff which depends on the two chosen ac-
tions.
We will analyze two scenarios. In the Scenario I we assume that LDC is the
leader, where as in the Scenario 2 DC will be the leader.
A sequential game of this kind is best represented in an extensive form (game
tree). For Scenario 1, see Tree 1. The numbers in the brackets are payoffs to the
players the values of which are exactly the same as the corresponding entries in
Matrix 1. The first and the second entries are payoffs to LDC and DC respectively.
As a consequence of the information structure, LDC knows exactly that if he
plays aciioti-L, then DC's best response is to play action-S, in which case the solution
gives payoff pair (.074; .350). On the other hand if LDC plays action-2, then DC
will surely respond with playing aciion-L, in which case the solution payoff pair is
(.143; .071 ). Being the leader, LDC can choose the best alternative, i.e. the action
that gives the greater payoff to him. Obviously, the equilibrium of this game is
that LDC plays action-2 and DC responds with playing action-1, in which case the
equilibrium payoff pair is (.143; .071 ).
For Scenario 2, see Tree 2. With the same argument it can be shown that the
underlined payoff pairs are potential solutions the best of which the leader (DC)
will choose. Clearly, the leader will choose payoff pair (.298; .258) which gives DC
a payoff of as much as .258 which is much. better than that given by the other
alternative, i.e .. 067. \Ve can conclude-therefore that the equilibrium of this game
is that DC plays action-l and LDC responds with playing aciion-L, ill which case
the equilibrium payoff pair (.298; .258). In the previous section we called this the
cooperative solution.
Some facts are worth noting here. In both scenarios DC's best action is Quiet
Diplomacy (DC's action-i). Both players prefer Scenario 2 which gives them better
payoffs. Therefore, DC has incentive to lead the game, and on the other hand LDC
prefers being the follower. Thus perfect information structure leads the players
to the cooperative solution which is more stable than the cooperative equilibrium
we claimed in the previous section. We need to define what we mean by a stable
equilibrium before claiming our finding in this section.
Definition 4 (Stable Equilibrium in Stackelberg Game) An equilibrium in a
Stackelberg game is said to be stable if only if all the players prefer this equilibrium
to any other equilibria in any possible scenarios of the game.
Claim 5 (The Existence of Stable Cooperative Equilibrium) In the dynamic
games with complete and perfect information there exists a stable cooperative equi-
librium.
Proof. The number of possible scenarios in the dynamic games is only two,
i.e. Scenario 1 where LDC is the leader, and Scenario 2 where DC is the leader.
As shown in the text, in Scenario 1 the equilibrium gives a payoff pair (.143; .071);
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where as in Scenario 2 the equilibrium gives a payoffpair (.298;.258). Clearly, both
players prefer Scenario 2 to Scenario 1, and therefore the equilibrium in Scenario 2
is stable. According to Definition 1, this stable equilibrium is called the cooperative
equilibrium. ••
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided an example of the effects of dynamic aspects and infor-
mation structures on the solution of possible conflicts in the global economic and
trading system. While the model can be considered as highly stylized and heavily
dependent on the result of the so called Analytic Hierarchy process, it has casted
some light on the possible cooperative solution of the conflicts. Our results support
the idea of broadening time horizon (i.e. avoiding myopic time horizon) in dealing
with conflicts which have potentially important impact. They also support the idea
of promoting information exchange between the parties in conflicts, the example of
which are envisaged by Lawrence et al (1995).
For further study, some aspects of uncertainty (incomplete information structure)
can be incorporated into the model. The idea of infinitely repeating the game like
the one we discussed in this paper may seem unappealing. But it is also we known
that finitely repeating the game (e.g. Prisoners Dilemma) will not basically alter
the solution of the single stage game. By changing the structure of information (i.e.
incorporating uncertainty) wemay find some interesting results (Kreps et aI, 1982).
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Tree 1. Scenario 1 of the Dynamic Game with Complete and Perfect
Information
LDC
action-l action-Z
DC I.
action-l action-l action- 3
(.298;.258) (.074:.350) (.143; .071) (.104;.067)
Figure 1: LDC is the Leader, DC is the Follower
Note: The numbers in the brackets are payoffs to LDC and D9 respectively.
The underlined payoff pairs are the potential solutions:
The payoff pair printed in bold characters is the equilibrium.
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Tree 2. Scenario 2 of the Dynamic Game with Complete and Perfect
Information
DC
LDC
(.198; .258) (.143;.071)
1.
(.074;.350) (.104'067)
Figure 2: DC is the Leader, LDC is the Follower
Note: The numbers in the brackets are payoffs to LDC and DC respectively.
The underlined payoffpairs are the potential solutions.
The payoff pair printed in bold characters is the equilibrium.
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